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NOTES

CHILDREN'S CODE-NEGLECT-State ex rel. Health &
Social Services Departmentv. NaturalFather

I. INTRODUCTION

In State ex rel. Health & Social Services Department v. Natural
Father' the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of
the Children's Court removing three children from the custody of
their parents, and granting legal and physical custody to the Health
and Social Services Department (HSSD). 2 The trial court's action
was based upon its conclusion that the children were "neglected children" as defined by the Children's Code.3 This is the first reported
New Mexico case in which children were held to be neglected within
the meaning of the statute by reason of the conduct and mental incapacity of their parents. An adjudication of neglect now has
broader implication in New Mexico than merely the parents' temporary loss of custody. Under the newly amended version of N.M.
Stat. Ann. §40-7-4(B)(3) a prior determination of neglect may now
be used as a basis for the termination of all parental rights with
respect to the children. 4 The statute under which State v. Natural
1. 93 N.M. 222, 598 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1979) [hereinafter State v. Natural Father].
2. The Health and Social Services Department was abolished effective March 31, 1978. Its
social service operations were taken over by the Department of Human Services on that date.
New Mexico Executive Reorg. Laws, ch. 252 §§ 5, 15 (1977).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-14-3(L)(2) and (3) (1953 Comp.). These provisions became §§32-13(L)(2) and (3) in the 1978 compilation of the New Mexico statutes. Pertinent parts of the original statute read as follows:
L. "neglected child" means a child:

4.

(2) who is without proper parental care and control of subsistence, education,
medical, or other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the
faults or habits of his parents, guardian or custodian, or their neglect or refusal
when able to do so, to provide them;
(3) whose parents, guardian or custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child because of their incarceration, hospitalization or
other physical or mental incapacity. ...
B. The court shall terminate parental rights with respect to a minor child when:

(3) the child is neglected or an abused child as defined by § 32-1-3 NMSA 1978
and the court finds that the conditions and causes of neglect are unlikely to
change in the forseeable future despite reasonable efforts of the department or
other appropriate agency to assist the parent in adjusting the conditions which
render the parent unable to properly care for the child. . ..
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-7-4(b)(3)(Cum. Supp. 1981).
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Father was brought now serves two functions: 1) it is the basis for
temporarily removing children from their families; and 2) may subsequently be the basis for breaking up the family permanently. This
Note focuses on the constitutional substantive due process problem
created by the application of the broadly drafted statute to the facts
in this case. Although six issues were included in the court of appeals' opinion,' the scope of this Note is limited to one evidentiary
issue dealing with the propriety of findings 6 because that issue most
clearly illustrates the constitutional problem.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 6, 1978, HSSD filed a Neglect Petition in Bernalillo
County Children's Court Division, together with an affidavit for an
ex parte order,' to remove three of five children in the family to
HSSD custody.' HSSD asserted in the Neglect Petition that the chil5. On appeal, five issues were raised and briefed by petitioners. The court of appeals,
however, identified six issues in its opinion. 93 N.M. at 224, 598 P.2d at 1184. The first three
issues tested the constitutionality of the neglect statute per se. The parents challenged the title
of the Children's Code as providing no notice, and the phrases "other care and control" and
"mental incapacity" as being unconstitutionally vague as written. Id. at 224, 225, 598 P.2d at
1184, 1185. The parents also asserted that the lack of an explicit statutory definition of neglect
permitted an unconstitutional delegation of power to HSSD. Id. at 225, 598 P.2d at 1185. The
fourth issue, statutory interpretation, had been included by petitioners in their vagueness argument, but the court identified it as a separate issue. Id. at 226, 598 P.2d at 1186. In connection
with that issue the parents contended that the trial court used definitions for "other care and
control" and "mental incapacity" which were contrary to their meaning. The court rejected
this argument.
The remaining two issues were evidentiary in nature. Id. at 226, 598 P.2d at 1186. The first,
propriety of findings, is the subject of this Note. Id. at 226, 227, 598 P.2d at 1186, 1187. The
second issue was whether the court had erred in limiting the parents' evidence as to the status of
other children in the family. Id. at 227, 228, 598 P.2d at 1187, 1188.
6. The parents challenged the trial court's findings as being based on evidentiary facts rather
than ultimate facts. Brief of Respondents-Appellants at 14, State v. Natural Father, 93 N.M.
222, 598 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1979). There is no discussion in either the appellant's Brief-inChief or the court of appeals' opinion as to the distinction between evidentiary and ultimate
facts, nor are there any citations to clarify the distinction. It is therefore not possible to determine what argument the appellant was advancing, and what argument, if any, the court
dismissed without discussion. The parents also asserted that not only were the findings of fact
erroneous, but that the conclusions of law were erroneous because they could not be supported
by clear and convincing evidence. Brief of Respondents-Appellants at 25. The court in State v.
Natural Father addressed itself only to the issue whether there was clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to support the findings. It did not consider the assertion of error concerning
evidentiary as opposed to ultimate facts. 93 N.M. at 277, 598 P.2d at 1187.
7. The neglect petition was filed pursuant to § 13-14A-42 (1953 Comp., Repl. Vol. 1976)
which is comparable to the current N.M. R. Child. Ct. Pro. 57.
8. Under § 13-14A-40 (1953 Comp., Repl. Vol. 1976) the court could issue an ex parte
custody order upon sworn statement of facts showing that there was probable cause to believe
that a child was neglected. The Children's Court currently has that power under N.M. R.
Child. Ct. Pro. 52.
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dren were neglected children as defined by the following pertinent
portions of the statute:
L. "neglected child" means a child:
(2) who is without proper parental care and control of subsistence, education, medical or other care or control necessary
for his well-being because of the faults or habits of his parents,
guardian or custodian or their neglect or refusal, when able to
do so, to provide them; or
(3) whose parents, guardian or custodian are unable to discharge
their responsibilities to and for the child because of their incarceration, hospitalization or other physical or mental incapacity;
9

HSSD alleged that the three children were neglected within the
meaning of the statute because the mother was incapable of providing proper care to the children due to her limited intellectual ability.'° In addition, HSSD alleged that the father could not adequately
supervise and direct the mother because of his own limited intellectual ability." The ex parte order was granted, and a guardian ad
litem was appointed for the three children.' 2 An adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the children should remain in HSSD's custody was held.' 3 At the hearing, testimony was taken from people
who had worked with or had known the family over a period of
years, including a social worker and two directors of the Peanut But9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-14-3(L)(2) and (3) (1953 Comp.) now codified at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§32-1-2(L)(2) and (3) (1981).
10. Testimony from one of the witnesses placed the mother's level of intelligence in the fiftyfive to sixty-five range. Record at 4.
11. The clinical psychologist testifying for HSSD placed the father's IQ in the fifty to seventy range. Record at 88.
12. N.M. R. Child. Ct. Pro. 57(d) required upon the filing of a neglect petition, the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the child or children alleged to be neglected.
13. Under former Children's Court Rules of Procedure as well as under current Rules, two
separate hearings are required. N.M. R. Child. Ct. Pro. 54(a) requires that a custody hearing
be held within ten days from the date the neglect petition is filed if the child is in custody of
HSSD. At the hearing it must be shown that probable cause exists that a child is not receiving
adequate care for an illness or injury, will be subject to injury, has been abandoned, or is not
receiving adequate supervision or care.
Under N.M. Child. Ct. Pro. 60, an adjudicatory hearing is also required and must be held
within sixty days. Currently, under N.M. Stat. Ann. §32-1-27(J) (Repl. Pamp. 1981), the respondent has the right to introduce evidence on his own behalf, and to confront and cross- examine witnesses. Under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, as was true under the statutes at the time this case was
decided.
Both hearings were held as required by the Rules. Respondents' counsel expressly waived the
time limit provisions established in N.M. R. Child. Ct. Pro. 60(a), however, in order for the
respondents to obtain further psychiatric and psychological evaluations.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

ter and Jelly School." Witnesses testified to the unsanitary conditions of the house,' 5 and the mother's apparent inability to plan for
and carry out the day-to-day care of both the house and the children." Witnesses testified to the physical, emotional, and mental
condition of the children,' 7 and a clinical psychologist testified as to
the results of his examination of the parents and the oldest child.' 8
On the basis of this testimony relative to the mental incapacity of
their parents,' 9 the Children's Court found the three children to be
neglected children as defined by the Children's Code and concluded
that the children should remain in HSSD's custody. Judgment and
14. The Peanut Butter and Jelly School accepts and works with very young children who,
because of developmental delay, are likely to have learning difficulties when they become
school age. All three children involved in the custody proceedings were enrolled in the school at
the time the neglect petition was filed. Record at 118-120.
15. Testimony was based on observations made by the social worker and one of the school's
directors while working or visiting at the family's home. These witnesses testified that food was
left sitting out uncovered and unrefrigerated for long periods of time, that floors were not
swept and garbage was allowed to remain on the floor, that the toilet and bathroom were
filthy, and that broken or otherwise unusable furniture was allowed to accumulate in two
rooms of the house. Record at 49, 52, 53, 134, 135, 142, 153.
16. The social worker testified that while the mother was cooperative with the various people assigned by agencies to work with her she could not or would not carry out the same tasks
on her own. "I think she understood what was necessary. I don't think she was motivated or
capable of following through with those things. . . . It seemed like the things we talked about
never got done." Record at 55.
17. The record indicates that the bulk of the testimony about the children was centered on
the oldest child. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, the children to be removed were six
years, three years, and eleven months old. The oldest and youngest children to be removed
were male. Record at 4.
According to the record, the oldest child to be removed was a severely retarded, emotionally
disturbed child (possibly psychotic), who was tense, anxious, frightened, unable to cope with
new situations, and, at the age of five, unable to communicate. Record at 91-94, 119, 125-127,
145-150.
Testimony as to the condition of the two younger children was more limited. There was testimony that the three-year-old girl was beginning to exhibit some of the same symptoms as those
exhibited by the older, emotionally disturbed boy. Record at 146. In addition, one of the directors of the school testified that while both of the younger children were developmentally
delayed, the girl was much more so. Record at 152. Testimony related to the youngest child was
limited to statements that his motor skills development was delayed; he could not pull himself
into a sitting position, and could not achieve focus. Record at 151.
18. The court ordered that psychiatric or psychological evaluations be provided the respondents through the services of the Bernalillo County District Court Clinic. Record at 16. The
only testimony as to psychological evaluations, however, was presented by the clinical psychologist as a witness for HSSD. He testified that the mother's retardation coupled with an impulsive personality made it unlikely that she would ever learn adequate parenting skills. The
psychiatrist also testified that while the father was not as retarded nor as severely emotionally
disturbed as the mother, he was completely dominated by the mother and, therefore, unable to
give her any direction or assistance in caring for the children. The psychologist also noted that
the mother had a strong negative feeling toward men.
19. Record at 226.
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disposition were entered to that effect. 20 On appeal by the parents,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Children's Court.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The court of appeals' opinion in State v. Natural Father is the
New Mexico courts' first attempt to give substance to the definition
of "neglected child" as found in the Children's Code. 2 ' In particular, clarification has been needed on what proof is required to
support a conclusion of neglect: whether only abnormal parental
behavior must be shown, or whether its effect on the child must also
be shown. An ambiguity arises because while §§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3)
purport to define a neglected child, the definition focuses solely on
parental behavior. No proof as to the effect of parental behavior on
the child is required. 2 The opinion in State v. NaturalFatherdid little to clarify that ambiguity.
The question before the appellate court in this case was whether
the evidence was sufficient to support the findings made by the trial
court. 23 The parents argued that the findings were not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. 2" The court agreed with the parents as
to finding of fact number sixteen and determined that there was not
sufficient evidence to support a finding of severe emotional, mental,
and social retardation as to the two youngest children; that the
evidence of retardation was sufficient only as to the oldest boy.25
The court held that a determination of severe retardation was not
20. The dispositional hearing was held May 31, 1978. The initial judgment and disposition
was filed July 27, 1978. An amended judgment and disposition was entered nunc pro tern on
October 11, 1978. Record at 39.
21. See note 3, supra.
22. Compare §§32-1-2(L)(2) and (3) with the New York statute, N.Y. Jud. Law § 1012 (f)
(McKinney 1975), which requires proof that the child is physically, mentally, or emotionally
impaired, or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of his parent's failure to
supply adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care, and proper supervision.
See also Montana's definition of neglected child: " 'an abused or neglected child' means a
child whose normal physical or mental health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm by
acts or omissions of his parents ..
" Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §41-3-102 (2)(1979).
Both the New York and the Montana statute require proof of actual or potential harm to the
child, while the New Mexico statute does not.
23. See note 5, supra. See note 27, infra for pertinent findings of the trial court.
24. The statute governing the neglect proceeding requires that a finding of neglect be made
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(F) (1978).
25. Finding No. 16, which was held by the appellate court to be related to the oldest boy
states: "JOHN DOE, JANE DOE, AND TOM DOE are all severely retarded mentally, emotionally, and socially."
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needed to support the trial court's conclusion of neglect as to the
younger children, however, because the other findings alone were
sufficient to support that conclusion. ' 6 While it is clear from the
opinion that a finding of retardation is not needed to reach a conclusion of neglect, the court did not make clear exactly what is needed
to support such a determination. An analysis of the remaining findings" in State v. Natural Father leads to three possible conclusions
as to what must be proved under §§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) for the court
to decide to remove a child from his parents' custody.
26. The appellate court stated: "As defined in §32-1-3(L)(2) and (3), supra, evidence that
the child is severely retarted is not required for a ruling that the child is neglected." 93 N.M. at
277, 598 P.2d at 1187.
27. The findings which remain applicable to the two youngest children after the court of appeals' action include Findings Six through Fifteen which are related to the parents' disabilities
and limited ability to maintain a home and care for the children:
6. When the children were living with the respondents, MOTHER failed to
properly maintain the home, resulting in filthy living conditions and a continuous stench.
7. FATHER realized that the living conditions in the home were very bad but
did nothing to improve the situation.
8. MOTHER and FATHER failed to provide a proper home environment conducive to the normal mental, emotional and social development of the children.
9. Numerous attempts were made to help the family by agents from several different agencies including the Peanut Butter and Jelly Therapeutic Pre-School,
the Family Resource Center, and the Family Health Center, but the family made
no progress while the children were living in the respondents' home.
10. MOTHER is retarded mentally, emotionally, and socially.
11. MOTHER is retarded in her ability to exercise good judgment in understanding the consequences of her actions, in understanding the needs of her
children, in controlling her impulses, and in her capability for providing a
minimally adequate home for the children.
12. FATHER is retarded mentally and emotionally.
13. FATHER has poor judgment and cannot directly provide the day-to-day
care and supervision that the children need.
14. FATHER cannot provide the supervision of MOTHER which is necessary to
maintain a minimally adequate home for the children.
15. Psychological evaluations establish that the ability of MOTHER and
FATHER to learn proper parenting skills is poor.
and Findings Seventeen through Nineteen:
17. The cause of the children's retardation is a continuing lack of proper parenting by MOTHER and FATHER.
18. The children would suffer further and more severe emotional and mental
harm if returned to the custody of either or both their parents. The respondents'
lack of proper parenting for the children has caused the disintegration of the
parent-child relationship (emphasis added).
19. Since the children have been removed from the respondents' care and
custody and placed in foster care, they have all dramatically improved mentally,
emotionally, and socially.
93 N.M. at 226, 227, 598 P.2d at 1186, 1187.
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No Showing ofActual Harm Required
The first possible interpretation of the holding in State v. Natural
Father is to conclude that no showing of actual harm to the child is
required under §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3); that parental disabilities and
lack of skill in caring for their children are a sufficient basis for a
determination of neglect. There are three aspects of the case which
support this possible interpretation: 1) except for the finding of
retardation as to the two youngest children, the findings do not
2
specifically identify any other harm suffered by the two children,
2) language in the opinion reflects this position,2 9 and 3) such an interpretation is consistent with the statute because there is not explicit
requirement that harm be shown.3"
This interpretation, however, leaves §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) susceptible to a substantive due process challenge because it permits the
possibility of arbitrary interference by the state in the life of a family. 3' The substantive due process challenge to these sections can be
made because of the constitutional protection accorded some aspects
of family life, and the right of the family to be free from arbitrary
interference by the state in those areas. 3 2 Parent-child relationships
28. See note 27, supra.
29. Under the statutory interpretation issue, the court said: "The trial court concluded that
each of the three children was a neglected child by 'reason of the conduct and mental incapacity' of the parents." 93 N.M. at 226, 598 P.2d at 1186.
30. See note 3, supra.
31. The parents did not raise a substantive due process challenge on appeal. The challenges
made by the parents were only procedural in nature. See note 5, supra.
32. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties included within the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) the Court held that Virginia's miscegenation statute was unconstitutional both on
equal protection and due process grounds because it interfered with marriage, one of the basic
civil rights of man. The Court reaffirmed the fundamental character of marraige in Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) stating that it had been placed on the same level of importance as
decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family relationships. Id. at 386.
The Court in Zablocki invalidated a Wisconsin statute requiring a person with support obligations to a child not in his custody to obtain the permission of a court before marrying. The
statute was held to be unconstitutional because it interfered with the right of a class of people
to marry, and because the interest the state sought to protect was not served by the statute.
Procreation has also been designated as a basic civil right under both equal protection and
due process analyses. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court held Oklahoma's statute requiring sterilization of thrice-convicted felons unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it unjustifiably interfered with the right of a class of people to procreate. Subsequent decisions related to procreation have been based on substantive due process
grounds. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court found that the state had interfered
with a woman's decision to obtain an abortion, and in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) that state action interfered with a married couple's decision to use contraceptives. The
Court has also deemed protected those decisions related to childrearing and education, see note
31, supra.
Even decisions related to the maintenance of the family unit as a whole appear to receive a
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and decisions related to child-rearing are specifically included under
the constitutional protection afforded the family.3" A statute which
encroaches upon a constitutionally protected area of family life is
subjected to at least a two-part analysis under the test used in Roe v.
Wade:3 4 the statute must reflect a compelling state interest, and it
must be narrowly tailored to that interest. While the United States
Supreme Court has used other tests in family life cases, they are not
applicable to the analysis of §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) for factual as
well as policy reasons."
high degree of constitutional protection. In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the
Court invalidated the city's ordinance which limited occupation of a dwelling to members of a
single family, and stated: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition [footnote omitted]." Id. at 503. It is clear that while some aspects of family life may be regulated, id. at 499, the protection afforded the family unit is sufficient to protect it from "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." Id. at 502, quoting from Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-543 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
33. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court considered whether the state
could interfere with parents' rights to make decisions about the rearing and education of children under their control. The Meyer court held that a state statute prohibiting the instruction
of any foreign language to young children was an arbitrary interference with parents' decisions
about their children's education. Id. at 403. The Court reasserted this position in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which it affirmed an order enjoining the state of
Oregon from enforcing legislation which required all children to be educated in public schools.
The extent of that protection was outlined in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
where the Court said, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents ..
" Id. at 166. Protection of this relationship is extended even in
those cases where the parent-child relationship has not been legitimized by marriage. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also H.L. v. Matheson, 49 U.S.L.W. 4255 (1981) (Court
upheld a Utah state statute requiring physician to notify minor's parents prior to performing
abortion). The New Mexico Court of Appeals in a recently decided case involving the termination of parental rights noted that the nature of that right was a "liberty" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State exrel. Dept. Human Servs. v. Perlman, 20
N.M. St. Bar Bull. 1038 (October 1, 1981).
34. The Court in Roe v. Wade states: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the
Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest [citation omitted],' and that legislative reactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interest at stake [citation omitted]." 410 U.S. at 155. This analysis of a
statute related to family life was recently affirmed in H.L. v. Matheson, 49 U.S.L.W. 4255
(1981), wherein the Court stated: "As applied to the class properly before us, the statute
plainly serves important state interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and
does not violate any guarantee of the Constitution [footnote omitted]." Id. at 4259.
35. Other less stringent tests have been used to determine the constitutionality of statutes in
cases involving some aspect of family life. For example, the test in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), is whether the statute reflects a legitimate state interest, and whether the statute is a
legitimate means of achieving that interest. The Court decided Stanley on equal protection
grounds holding unconstitutional an Illinois statute which presumed the unfitness of unwed
fathers and denied them custody of their children upon the mother's death. A second two-part
test is found in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). When the government intrudes
upon choices in family living arrangements, the Court must examine 1) the importance of the
governmental interest, and 2) the extent to which that interest is served by the regulation. The
test in *Mooreappears to have been framed specifically for those statutes infringing on family
living arrangements. The test in Stanley is applicable when the constitutionality of a statute is
being challenged on equal protection grounds. Neither test would be appropriate in analyzing
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The statute clearly reflects a compelling and legitimate state interest under the first part of the test. The state interest furthered by
§§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) is the protection of the emotional and mental
health of children. 6 The United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin
v. Yoder37 noted that harm to a child's physical or mental health
would be a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the state's
intervention into family relationships under its parens patrie
power."3 The statute cannot withstand constitutional analysis as to
the second part of the test, however, because it is not narrowly
drafted. The statute permits the state to intervene as it did in State v.
Natural Father, when there is no proof that the children are suffering harm and actually need the state's protection. Because the statute
does not require proof of harm to the child, children may be removed from their parents when it is the court's opinion that they
should be. The protection afforded constitutionally protected liberties includes freedom from arbitrary and discretionary decisionmaking of this type."9 A narrowly drafted statute prevents arbitrary
decision-making by identifying explicit standards for those seeking
to enforce them. 0 If §§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) are interpreted as requiring no proof of actual or potential harm to the child, then they permit arbitrary interference with family relationships, and are therefore unconstitutional.
Potential Harm Required
A second interpretation of the opinion is that the potential harmful effect of the parent's behavior must be shown. The basis for this
sections 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) because the New Mexico statute does not infringe upon choices in
family living arrangements, and the challenge to the statute is a substantive due process challenge, not an equal protection challenge.
36. The legislative purpose is stated at the beginning of the Children's Code as providing for
the "care, protection and wholesome mental and physical development of children." N.M.
Stat. Ann. §32-1-2(A)(1978).
37. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. Id. at 230.
39. The Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), invalidated those portions of a Texas
abortion statute which required additional administrative decisions as to the propriety of an
abortion leaving the decision to the attending physician's best clinical judgment. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger discussed the majority's decision and noted that where the
consequences of state intervention are so severe, "uncertainty must be avoided as much as possible." Id. at 208. See note 32, supra.
40. "[lhf arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972). The Court made this statement in the context of considering a void for vagueness argument over Rockford's anti-noise ordinance. While a similar vagueness argument was made and
rejected in this case, see note 5, supra, the issue of whether the statute might permit
unreasonable interference with a constitutionally protected right because of the lack of explicit
standards was not considered. See note 32, supra.
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interpretation is the trial court's finding that "the children would
suffer further and more severe emotional and mental harm if returned to the custody of either or both their parents."' The appellate court's action on the evidentiary issue leaves this interpretation
questionable because it is unclear whether Finding No. 18 applies to
the two youngest children. The language "further and more severe
harm" appears to be logically related to the severe mental, emotional, and social retardation in Finding No. 16.42 Because Finding
No. 16 is not applicable to the two youngest children, however,
Finding No. 18 may not be either. If Finding No. 18 can be understood independently of No. 16, so that it reads, "the children would
suffer . . . emotional and mental harm if returned to their parents," then it would clearly be applicable to all three children, and
State v. Natural Father could be interpreted as requiring proof of
probable or potential harm.
This interpretation also leaves §§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) susceptible
to a substantive due process challenge for the same reasons discussed
above."3 The decision as to whether the circumstances justify taking
children from their parents may still be an arbitrary one, based on
the biases of the court. It may be that a family's lifestyle and childrearing practices vary from those of the community, and the court
can infer potential harm because of the discrepancy. This inference
of harm may be determined to be sufficient, under State v. Natural
Father, to break up a family. Unless the finding of potential harm is
based on substantial evidence as to how and why children would be
harmed by present parental behavior, thereby justifying state intervention, the "potential harm" interpretation also renders §§32-1-3
(L)(2) and (3) unconstitutional.
Actual Harm Required
The third possible interpretation of State v. NaturalFather, that
present harm to the child must be found before a child is adjudicated
to be a neglected child under §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3), is somewhat
tenuous. This interpretation is based on the possibility that the court
was relying on Finding No. 18, the only finding which might be said
to have identified actual harm to all three children: "lack of proper
parenting for the child has caused the disintegration of the parentchild relationship.""
41.
42.
43.
44.

Finding No. 18, see note 27, supra.
Finding No. 16, see note 27, supra.
See text accompanying notes 31-36, supra.
Finding No. 18, see note 27, supra.
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Support for this interpretation can be found by analogizing to
State v. Smith,4 5 a recently decided case on the termination of parental rights. State v. Smith was decided under the prior version of
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-4 which required proof that the minor had
suffered serious physical, mental, or emotional harm for termination of parental rights. 6 The Smith court held that the mother's
failure to provide a home for the child, and her lack of contact with
the child resulted in the absence of the parent-child relationship.
Absence of this relationship resulted in "obvious mental and emotional harm to the child," '4 7 and was sufficient to satisfy the harm requirement of §40-7-4. While §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3) do not require
proof of harm, the court in State v. NaturalFather may have reasoned, as did the Smith court, that a poor or non-existent relationship between parent and child was harmful to the child and that
there was no justification for returning the three children to their
parents. This interpretation narrows the construction of the statute,
thereby making it constitutional. Under this interpretation, the decision to intervene would not be arbitrary. The state could only intervene when there was a finding that the child was suffering harm
and needed the protection of the state. Such a specific finding should
always be required to foreclose the possibility of any arbitrariness on
the part of the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ruling of the court of appeals in State v. NaturalFatherleaves
unclear the question of what evidence is needed to support a conclusion of neglect under N.M. Stat. Ann. §§32-1-3(L)(2) and (3);
whether no showing of actual harm is required, a showing of potential harm would be sufficient, or a showing of actual harm to the
child is required. If the statute is interpreted to require no showing of
harm at all, or is interpreted to require a showing of potential harm,
the statute is susceptible to a substantive due process challenge
because such interpretations would allow the statute to be construed
45. 93 N.M. 348, 600 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1979).
46. A. The parental rights of a parent with respect to a minor may be terminated by
the court when:
(3) . . . because of such parental conduct the minor has suffered serious
physical, mental, or emotional harm; and such parental conduct will probably continue and the continuation of such parental conduct will probably
cause further and serious harm to the minor ....
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-7-4 (1978). Cf. the amended version of §40-7-4 at note 4, supra, which
does not require actual or probable harm.
47. 93 N.M. at 352, 600 P.2d at 298.
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too broadly and permit arbitrary interference with constitutionally
protected parent-child relationships. The constitutional protection
afforded families requires that decisions interfering with the family
unit involve as little arbitrariness as possible.
Following repeal of former §40-7-4 and reenactment by the 1979
legislature,"8 a finding of neglect now has an impact beyond the temporary removal of children from their parents' custody. Under the
amended version of §40-7-4, an adjudication of neglect may become
part of the basis for the termination of all parental rights if the state
can show no change in the conditions underlying the neglect determination. Because the state's action in removing a child has tremendous impact on a family's life, and because of the constitutional requirement, State v. Natural Father should be read as requiring at
least a finding of probable harm to the child. While a better result
might be achieved through amending the statute to expressly require
a finding of actual or probable harm, the proposed reading of State
v. NaturalFather, to require a showing of actual harm, would limit
the discretion of the court in neglect cases, and avoid the constitutional difficulties underlying a too broad construction and application of §§ 32-1-3(L)(2) and (3).
SANDRA BACA

48. Law 1979, ch. 387, § I repeals §40-7-4 and reenacts the amended version.

